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COMMENTS I
SHOULD THE FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY THEORY
BECOME A REALITY?
Employer's immunity for the torts of his independent contractor is sub-
ject to many exceptions which add substantial uncertainty to this area of the
law. There is evidence of a trend in the direction of further encroachments
upon this immunity. This trend is based on a theory of social justice and
specifically, upon concern for the uncompensated plaintiff. Dicta in a recent
New Jersey case, Majestic Realty Ass'n, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co.,' suggests
an extension to employer's immunity which completely denudes this apparent
trend in the law.
The injured has no control over or relation with the contractor. The
contractee, true, has no control over the doing of the work and in that sense
is also innocent of the wrongdoing; but he does have the power of selection
and in the application of concepts of distributive justice perhaps much can be
said for the view that a loss arising out of the tortious conduct of a financially
irresponsible contractor should fall on the contractee. 2
In other words, the employer or contractee should be'liable to a third person
for the tort of his independent contractor because the contractor was financially
irresponsible.
The common law began with the premise that one man should not be
liable for another man's torts. This premise was modified with the develop-
ment of respondeat superior, a doctrine which owes its creation in part to the
assumption that the master is more capable of compensating the plaintiff than
is the servant.' In early English law employers of independent contractors
were no more insulated from liability than were masters,4 but in 1826 the
employer's immunity for the wrongful acts of his independent contractor was
established.' In 1853, after the employer's immunity seemed complete, the
first in a long list of exceptions was created.' The case of Bower v. Peate'
130 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321 (1959).
2 Id. at 325, 153 A.2d at 325.
'Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934). This is the
entrepreneur theory of the development of respondeat superior.
4 Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pul. 404, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (1799).
5 Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826).
6 Jane Ellis v. The Sheffield Gas Consumer Co., 2 El. & BI. 767, 118 Eng. Rep. 955 (1853).
The employer was liable for the negligent acts of his independent contractor if the latter was
employed to do an illegal act.
7 1 Q.B. 321 (1876).
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held that employers are liable for the negligent acts of their independent con-
tractors, provided the work to be done creates an inherent hazard and special
precautions are not taken.8 Since then exception after exception has been
added to the employer's immunity doctrine.' Chief Justice Gallagher in Pacific
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Broiler and Mfg. Co."0 remarked, "[I]t would be proper
to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog
of its exceptions."
A general exception to the doctrine exists when the contractee does not
select a competent contractor. The Restatement of Torts defines "competent"
to mean one who possesses the knowledge, skill, experience and available
equipment which a reasonable man would realize is necessary to avoid creat-
ing an unreasonable risk of harm.1 Note that nothing is said about the re-
quirement of financial responsibility. The suggested "financial irresponsi-
bility" theory extends the definition of "competent" to include the ability to
respond adequately to a tort claim. It places a duty of reasonable care on the
employer to select a financially responsible contractor.
The concept of social justice, which is the basis of the aforementioned
liberal trend in the law, is replacing the concept of individual justice. "The
shift should not be away from exercising moral bases but in the direction of
emphasizing social as against individual morality." 12 Justice Holmes artic-
ulated the ideas of individual justice in The Common Law. One statement
particularly applicable shows one policy behind this attitude: "T]he public
generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and
tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard
of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor." 13 However, modern
society seems to be reversing this policy and throwing the hazard of action and
development upon the actor on the ground that the rights of the individual
actor must be sacrificed to meet the demands of society. "In the larger sense
there is no loss of a moral point of view in the rule that one who innocently
8 In DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 792 (1st ed. 1872), the language of Bower v.
Peate was changed to "intrinsically dangerous."
" The most commonly accepted exceptions are: (a) when the employer is personally at fault
(example, job to be done is a tort); (b) when the employer selects an incompetent contractor;
(c) when the employer fails to exercise requisite supervision over part of the operation not
delegated under contract; (d) when the employer allows work to be done by dangerous methods;
(e) when there is a statutory nondelegable duty; (f) when a nondelegable common law duty exists
(example, landlord's duty to keep common approaches in reasonably good condition); (g) when
the work is inherently dangerous (sometimes included under nondelegable common law duty).
2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 26.11 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§410-429
(1935); 39 YALE L. J. 861 (1930).
10 201 Minn. 500, 502, 277 N.W. 226, 228 (1937).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 411 (1935).
12 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 753 (1956).
13 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881).
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causes loss should make it good; but it is social morality, and not personal
blame, which is involved." 14 In short, the defendant-mindedness, which was
perhaps over-emphasized during the era of rugged individualism, is giving
way to an equally over-emphasized plaintiff-mindedness. This movement is
labelled "socialization of law." 15
The suggestion that an employer be required to select a financially re-
sponsible contractor is representative of this social movement in the law."8 Its
proponents list as their main argument the socially desirable goal of elim-
inating from enterprise the financially irresponsible contractor. They argue
that an employer who hires a man to perform work, usually on the former's
premises, should be required to select a contractor who is able to compensate
a plaintiff for injuries. The only conclusive and sound way of accomplishing
this, they say, is to place a duty on the contractee to select financially com-
petent contractors. A breach of this duty results in liability to any person
who is negligently injured by the contractor. They argue that it is a simple
thing for the contractee to require that the contractor have liability insurance
or furnish an indemnity bond. This theory permits compensation to the plaintiff
without considering fault in the sense of foreseeing an unreasonable risk of
harm on the part of defendant as a condition precedent to liability. An em-
ployer may be liable even though he used due care to select an otherwise
competent 17 contractor and exercised reasonable care in all other respects to
prevent the injury.
This liberal view conflicts with the requirement of fault as a prerequisite
to liability. The proponents are fearful that if fault were a condition of liabil-
ity, it would so restrict recoveries as to limit severely the number of compen-
sated plaintiffs. 8 Harper and James advocate, "a wise distribution of accident
losses over society, without regard to fault, as under Workmen's Compensa-
tion laws." 10
However, to the conservatives, fault, the moral basis of the law,2" is a
necessary element in finding liability. They argue that we must not sacrifice
14PROSSER, TORTS 16 (2d ed. 1955).
15 Pound, The End of the Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARv. L REV.
195 (1914). At page 226 Dean Pound said that the new social movement studies the "satisfac-
tion of human wants, and it seems to put as the end of law the satisfaction of as many human
demands as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands. This new stage of legal develop-
ment may be called 'socialization of law'."
16 Pound, in listing the areas of the law which have been affected by the socialization of law,
mentions as one area the "imposition of liability without fault, particularly in the form of responsi-
bility for agencies employed." Pound, supra note 15, at 226.
17 As defined in RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 411 (1935).
18 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.4 (1956).
19 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, at 753.
20 Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1917).
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this moral notion for the goal of compensation to every innocent plaintiff.
The argument is: "[W]hat has to be shown is not merely that the sufferer
ought to be compensated, but that he ought to be compensated by the de-
fendant." 1
The history of our law shows a pattern of alternative approach and re-
treat from fault as a condition precedent to liability. It is uncertain which
came first.2" Yet, it is certain that liability with fault is a very important con-
cept in our law. Dean Ames commented in 1908: "The ethical standard of
reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's
peril." 23 Justice Holmes in The Common Law quoted Chief Justice Nelson
of New York, who said:
All the cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident, or, which
in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that ordinary human care and
foresight are unable to guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer and
lays no foundation for legal responsibility.24
Holmes argued that if this were not so, any act of the defendant, however
remote, could result in legal liability. He said that an "act" required the de-
fendant (actor) to foresee an unreasonable risk of harm and to have a choice
between acting reasonably or unreasonably in the circumstances. If the de-
fendant as a reasonable man could not foresee this risk, then the choice was
necessarily non-existent and there was no "act." It was this choice which con-
stituted a moral element in the law making the power to avoid damage to the
plaintiff a condition precedent to liability. Where this power did not exist,
there could be no liability. Concerning the liberal view of liability, Holmes
said: "The undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground that they
resulted from the defendant's act would ... be open ... to the still graver one
[objection] of offending the sense of justice." 25
The question, then, is this: is the goal of compensation to the innocent
plaintiff, based on liability without fault, so essential that its importance out-
weighs the desire to retain the moral foundation of the law? And more par-
ticularly, is the vicarious liability of the employer for the torts of his insolvent
independent contractor one of these essentials? Both questions should be an-
21 Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 137 (1951). This
was a lecture delivered at the University of London.
22 Justice Holmes believed it began with liability with fault and it has increasingly developed
into a system of liability without fault. On the other hand Wigmore, the author of the current
view, thought the law began with man acting at his peril and gradually became moralized until
liability was connected with fault. Isaacs, supra note 20.
23 Ames, Law and Morals, 22 H.Av. L. REv. 97 (1908). Delivered as an address at the
75th Anniversary of the Cincinnati Law School.
24 HOLMES, supra note 13, at 95.
25 Id. at 96.
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swered in the negative. Justice Holmes expressed a basic concept of our system
of justice when he said a man should not be found liable unless he in some
way caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Of course, there are certain
situations wherein liability without fault should be and is properly applied.
"If the moral notion that links fault with liability must to some extent be vio-
lated, our position must not be interpreted as the abandonment of an ideal;
it is but a new recognition of a human limitation from which human law can-
not be free." 2 It seems, however, that the liability of the employer of an
insolvent independent contractor is not one of these situations. There is no
real benefit to the community in a rule which subjects an employer to liability
in a situation where, as Holmes says, he has no choice of avoiding the injury
and therefore, he has committed no act. We would be holding an employer,
who has committed no act, liable solely because his independent contractor
is financially irresponsible. True, he has a choice of either hiring a finan-
cially competent or financially incompetent contractor, but that is not the
choice to which Holmes refers. The pertinent question is: does the employer
have a choice of preventing injury to the plaintiff ? In all the exceptions noted
in the Restatement of Torts,2" either the employer was at fault in some way
or there is a valid reason for the rule aside from the mere desire to increase
compensable situations in favor of accident victims. It may be that the
proponents of this "financial irresponsibility" theory are not advocating liabil-
ity without fault. Instead, they may be advocating liability with fault where
the fault is not in causing the platintiff's injury, but in hiring a contractor
financially unable to compensate the plaintiff.
There is no judicial discussion of this exact question but a few authorities
briefly allude to it:
[TJhe employer must have used care to select a competent contractor. Its
sister condition, that the contractor should also be financially responsible, ap-
pears always to have met with a cold reception, though it is true that both lack
of skill and absence of funds have been used at times to expose the "dummy
contractor." 28
All the cases that treated insolvency of the contractor as a significant point
have been concerned with exposing the "dummy" contractor. In these cases
insolvency was regarded as one element indicating an invalid contract,29 or
21 lsaacs, rupra note 20, at 978.
21 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 410-429 (1935); supra note 9.
28 Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHi. L. REv. 501, 505 (1935).
29 Nelson v. American Cement Plaster Co., 84 Kan. 792, 115 Pac. 578 (1911); Kellogg v.
Payne, 21 Iowa 575 (1866); Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873); Holbrook Cabot &
Rollins Corp. v. Perkins, 147 Fed. 166 (1st Cir. 1906); Smith, Scope of the Business: the
Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1222, 1245 (1940).
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bearing on the issue of independent contractor versus servant."0 Apparently,
these cases have caused some confusion among the authorities discussing the
"financial irresponsibility" theory. Although they have been cited for this
proposition, in fact the employer was held liable because there was either a
bad faith intent to contract away liability by using a "dummy" device or the
alleged contractor was, in reality, a servant.
Professor Morris appears to be the most articulate proponent of this
theory."' He argues that the "financial irresponsibility" theory is consistent
with the policy behind the "inherently dangerous" exception 2 to employer's
immunity. Morris states that the purpose of the latter exception is merely to
better plaintiff's chances of recovery.
It has been effectively argued that this is not the policy behind the "inher-
ently dangerous" exception. The policy is simply to prevent the employer who
is contemplating a venture which involves a high incidence of injury from con-
tracting away his liability. Another policy behind the rule is to prevent injury
by providing an incentive to the employer to hire a competent, skillful con-
tractor.3 If the courts have accepted professor Morris' argument, they have
not clearly indicated it in their opinions.
Even if the courts do consider the plaintiff's chances of recovery against
a particular contractor in invoking the "inherently dangerous" exception,
there is still no effective argument in favor of adopting the "financial irrespon-
sibility" theory. If the courts are plaintiff-minded in the "inherently danger-
ous" cases, it is because of the high incidence of injury involved. It follows that
if the "financial irresponsibility" theory is adopted on the basis of plaintiff-
mindedness, it should be limited to the cases involving a high incidence of in-
jury. In fact, the Majestic case appears to limit the theory in this way. The
30 Hercules Copper Co. v. Crenshaw, 21 Ariz. 15, 184 Pac. 996 (1919); Wallace v. Southern
Cotton-oil Co., 19 Tex. 18, 40 S.W. 399 (1897); Fehrenbacker v. Oaksdale Copper Mining Co.,
65 Wash. 134, 117 Pac. 870 (1911); Keech v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 166 N.C. 503, 82
S.E. 836 (1914); Southern Cotton-oil Co. v. Wallace, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 54 S.W. 638 (1899).
There are cases where the fact of insolvency had no bearing because the job could be carried out
by a person with little or no capital. White v. Olive Hill Fire Brick Co., 169 Ky. 834, 185 S.W.
107 (1916).
31 Morris, supra note 3.
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 416 (1935); Bower v. Peate, supra note 7.
3 Stubblefield v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 1018, 204 S.W.2d 718, 722
(1947); Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618 (1899);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note, Chapter 15, Topic 2.
34 Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock, supra note 33; Hardaker v. Idle Dist.
Council, 1 Q.B. 335 (1876). J. Cockburn's opinion in Bower v. Peate, supra note 7 supports both
these policies. Also see 27 AM. JuR., Independent Contractors, § 39 (1938) for support of the
second policy stated. It states that inherently dangerous work subjects the employer to an absolute,
nondelegable duty to see that all reasonable care is taken during its performance to protect third
persons from injury.
35 Supra note 1.
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court discusses the issue of inherent danger and. quotes this statement from an
earlier case: "I am not prepared to say that this fact [financial irresponsibility
of the contractor] may not be of some weight where the work to be done is
hazardous to others." "6 If the court decides that the work is inherently dan-
gerous, the employer will be liable on that basis and the financial inadequacy of
the contractor will not be necessary to find liability.
Realizing this, Professor Morris argues that all cases involve a high inci-
dence of injury and inherently dangerous situations. Therefore, the "financial
irresponsibility" theory should apply in all cases. However, the courts define
the danger arising in the "inherently dangerous" cases as being "incidental to
and characteristic of the work itself," whereas the danger in the ordinary case
arises from the improper "means and methods" of performance. 7 If the in-
herent danger case is only a particular segment of independent contractor law,
it follows that the "financial irresponsibility" theory should be imprisoned
within it and there to be forgotten.
There are other problems concerning the "financial irresponsibility"
theory. It imposes on the employer something in the nature of double foresee-
ability. He is required to foresee an unreasonable risk of harm even though
he hires a perfectly competent contractor and takes all other provisions reason-
ably necessary to prevent the creation of such a risk. In addition, as an in-
surer he is required to foresee the exact amunt of the judgment against the
contractor. The logical result of this rule, which would seemingly only be
invoked in the absence of some other exception creating joint liability, is that
the contractee would be required to pay the difference between what the con-
tractor can pay and the amount of the judgment. How much insurance should
the employer require the contractor to have before he employs him?
Then, too, there is the problem of requiring one businessman to guarantee
the tort liability of another businessman. Unlike the servant, the independent
contractor is carrying on an enterprise of his own rather than being a part of
the employer's enterprise" and for this reason it appears there is no presump-
tion that the employer has the deeper pocket.
He is the small businessman, incarnate, the last stubborn refuge of rugged
individualism. It is simply impossible to say that he is to pass from the scene
38 The case is Lawrence v. Shipman, rupra note 29, at 590. It appears in the Majestic case on
page 324.
37 Majestic v. Toti, supra note 1, at 326; Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 134 A.2d
20 (1957); Swearsky v. Stanly Dry Goods Co., 122 Conn. 7, 186 At. 556 (1936); 23 A.LR.
1095. Inherently dangerous work is also described as being "conspicuously, exceptionally, unusually
dangerous" and causes a reaction of "DANGER" in the mind of the listener in a way that other
work, "perhaps, in fact, equally dangerous does not." MECHEM, AGENCY § 487-488 (1952).
3 8 MECHEM, AGENCY, § 427 (1952).
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and give way to a "servant" class in either a lay or a law sense, nor is it in-
cumbent upon the employer ordinarily to question him closely as to his com-
petence or as to his financial ability, as a condition of immunity. Indeed, it
is a fair guess that by and large he is financially better able to absorb losses, as
he is certainly better able to prevent them than the individual employer him-
self would be.3 9
There may also be a valid argument against the fheory in the fact that
it would be too broad. All the other exceptions are limited to negligence of the
contractor committed while he is engaged in performing the terms of the con-
tract. The employer is not liable for collateral negligence of his independent
contractor." If adopted, would the "financial irresponsibility" theory be sim-
ilarly limited or would it place liability on the employer for any wrongful
acts of a financially inadequate contractor? It might appear that the latter in-
terpretation is more consistent with the stated policy behind the rule--to elim-
inate the insolvent contractor.
The matter of freedom of opportunity, which is eliminated by this theory,
is another problem to be considered. The elimination of freedom of oppor-
tunity for the contractor can only be justified if the need for the theory outweighs
the benefit to the community of freedom of opportunity.
This theory, if adopted, would add one more exception in the already con-
fused law of independent contractors and employers' immunity. An attempt at
understanding the extremely fine distinctions made by the Restatement of
Torts in sections 410-429 fails to all but the keenest and most perceptive eye.
As one authority said: "Our courts are undermining the old fault principles,
little by little in a manner which leaves many of us puzzled and confused about
the present state of the law." 41
With the exception of the dicta in Majestic v. Toti, there is very little
authoritative discussion on the "financial irresponsibility" theory, despite the
fact that it was mentioned in a few old cases and despite the stimulating
advocation of it by Professor Morris in 1934. Is this New Jersey case an indi-
cation of its future acceptance? We must wait and see!
LEONARD HORN.
99 Steffen, supra note 28, at 518. See 19 A.L.R. 1168 for examples of independent contractors.
40 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 426; Robbins v. The City of Chicago, 18 L. ed. 427 (1867);
Rosenquist v, Brooloiale Homes, Inc. 133 N.J.L. 305, 44 A.2d 33 (1945).
4' Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 396-7 (1951).
1960.]
